The Resolution does not create any “risk” or obligation to the parties, neither to the regime, nor to those State politically standing against Assad. While imposing the dismantling of the loyalist forces' chemical armory, such Resolution does not call for any kind of sanction in case of violation, nor it consider a coercive military intervention in order to impose its guidelines: that's because the Resolution it's not framed within UN Chart Chapter 7 regulation (which allows the use of force as extrema ratio). Thus, in the event of a violation, it would be necessary to wait an endless sequence of new talks, hoping that they could be able to bring the international community to a concrete solution. It's easily understandable how that Resolution does not represent a threat to Assad's regime and how it does not generate any duty to the international community. Such a consideration makes clear how weak are the roots on which the Resolution itself settles on.
Clearly, such Resolution will not be able to end this civil war. It does not mean that it won't be able to reach its goal, but a chemical armory destruction doesn't imply a cease-fire. Ban ki-Moon has defined the Resolution as an «historic vote», and maybe it really was; nevertheless, while in the last months the political e media attention has been stuck on the chemical weapons issue, in Syria rifles have been keeping firing, the bomb exploding and the dead's count rising.
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