Nigerian security forces will be tasked with contrasting Boko Haram. What the output of the battle would be, though, is not for us to know.
Operatively speaking, Nigeria «on paper […] maintains the broadest spectrum of capabilities in the region, but in reality much of its equipment is unfit to be deployed for prolonged periods of time»[1]. A second relevant problem concerns the fact that Boko Haram has been able to advantage from borders permeability and has been able to deepen its contacts with other militias operating in Sahel region. The result is that its offensive capabilities have increased: not only can Boko Haram use the “classic” IEDs and VBIEDs[2], but can also rely on RPGs, MPADs[3] and even armoured vehicles. Finally, the level and quality of training of Nigerian forces remains a problem: despite all the efforts that have been undertaken since 2011, what is happening «in the north of the country reflect a lack of effective counter-insurgency and intelligence-gathering capabilities»[4].
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake taking the creation of an Islamic State for granted. Nigerian forces are about to face a serious challenge but they may receive help from the neighbouring state or some form of support – more or less direct it may be – from some western countries[5].
[1] The Military Balance, Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa, 114:1, 411-470, p. 451.
[2] IED e VBIED stand respectively for Improvised Explosive Device and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device.
[3] RPG and MPAD stand respectively for Rocket-Propelled Grenade and Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems.
[4] The Military Balance, Ibidem.
[5] During the crisis in which Boko Haram and other groups were involved in the kidnapping of 60 schoolgirls, for example, France and the United States played their role.
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