1.     Iraq – The Islamic Caliphate threatening Baghdad

The current Iraqi crisis has drawn international attention back to the Middle East. The ferocious offensive of the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIS[1] or simply as Islamic State), which announced the birth of a new Islamic Caliphate under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leadership, rises deep concerns due to its potentially destabilising consequences in terms of security for both Iraq and international community.

1.1.  Analysing the crisis: roots and premises

The Iraqi crisis shows all sings of a sectarian conflict. Sunni and Shia Muslims are currently following a long lasting blood trail which dates back to the European Medieval period.

In modern Iraq, one of the few countries in which Shia Muslims stand as majority among the population (see Chart 1), Sunni-Shia dualism has been the major cause of conflict. After British colonial occupation, Shia Muslims have been victims of many persecutions, especially during Ba’th party and Saddam Hussain era. United States 2003 military intervention may have succeeded in deposing the Raʾīs but it failed in stopping the inter-religious rivalry. Or rather, not only did the second Gulf war shake an already fragile political and social structure, but it also created favourable condition for armed sectarian violence: all governments that have ruled since 2003 have made Shia Muslims “revenge” possible but they have also watered the “discord seed” creating the premises for armed uprisings.

Table 1: Countries with Shia Muslims majority [source: Pew Research Centre, Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009]

1.2. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant can be suitably defined as a Sunni jihadist group whose purpose is to create an Islamic Caliphate ruling over the whole Islamic world in the names of the Caliph and Sharia.

Basically, the ISIL is the latest evolution of a radical group that has been active almost for a decade: firstly known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from 2004, it changed its name into Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 and into Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2013) after its involvement into the Syrian civil war.

Despite being a fundamentalist group, ISIL has currently little to share with al-Qaeda. There are no doubts regarding early connections between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AQI founder and ISIL forerunner) and Osama Bin Laden’s network, but the relations between the two groups started falling apart when al-Zarqawi refused to follow Bin Laden’s “no-Muslim-must-be-targeted” policy[2]. 2013 may be considered as a turning point: AQI leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi claimed control over al-Nusra, the Islamic front emerged from the fogs of the Syrian civil war and deeply tied to al-Qaeda. When al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani refused to recognise al-Baghdadi authority, ISIL started targeting al-Nusra members. So, any link between ISIL and al-Qaeda (and al-Nusra) is barely imaginable at the moment.

What make up ISIL strength are its human and military resources. ISIL can count on a sort of international militia formed by more than 1000 men coming from all over the Middle East, members of Saddam’s Republican Guard and Sunni tribal groups. In terms of military capabilities, having a meaningful operative history, ISIL gunmen master guerrilla techniques and possess the necessary tools and equipment to put them into practice[3]. Moreover, being ISIL offensive considered as a “holy mission” by its followers, it poses a very serious threat to regional and global security.

1.3. ISIL offensive

Here follows a concise timeline retracing all main steps of ISIL offensive which led to the occupation of all areas that currently under their control:

- 30-31 December 2013: clashes in Anbar Province. Iraqi army tries to suppress a protest in provincial capital, Ramadi. On the 31^st, ISIL occupies parts of Ramadi and Fallujah helped by anti-government tribal groups.

- January-May 2014: ISIL confronts Iraqi army. ISIL and the Iraqi army fights in order to control Ramadi and Fallujah (so far still in ISIL’s hands).

- June 2014: ISIL offensive begins. The offensive starts in Samarra (June 5), they occupies Mosul (after the army fled on the 10^th) and Kirkuk (controlled by Kurdish Peshmerga since June 13). ISIL offensive continues and they occupy some strategic areas (such as Baiji oil refinery) and iconic places (such as Tikrit, Saddam Hussain native town). Then, ISIL penetrates in Diyala Province. Despite Iraqi army efforts to push them back from their positions, ISIL has been able to keep control over almost all occupied areas.

- 29 June: Islamic Caliphate birth. Thanks to its territorial control, ISIL announces the birth on an Islamic Caliphate that should rule from Aleppo (in Syria) to Diyala Province (in Iraq) under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leadership, the Caliph.

Picture 1: Areas controlled by ISIL (or ISIS) as of July 28, 2104 [source: Jessica D. Lewis; Middle East Security Report 21 - July 2014, The Islamic State: a Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State; Institute for the Study of War; Washington DC].

1.4.Iraqi future

Being ISIL close to Baghdad, it may be legitimate to expect an army counteroffensive:  much as uncertain the output may be, there are almost no doubts about the bloodshed that would be caused if a battle for the Capital began. Moreover, should the ISIL enlarge its control over southern Iraq and over its oil wells, the government would face serious political and economic consequences.

Kurdish involvement remains a sort of a question mark. Peshmerga want to protect their territory, they are driven by the hope to see an independent Kurdish state and they have been pushing for an independence referendum since early July. Due to this unclear situation, it’s difficult to predict what is going to happen to Iraqi Kurdistan in the foreseeable future.

Finally, although a real offensive over Syrian or Iraqi borders might be ruled out, the Islamic Caliphate stands out as a serious threat to the neighbouring countries. The real danger is represented by potential infiltration of ISIL cells: due to the Caliphate geographical position, Lebanon, Jordan and Iran might be ideal targets. Moreover, should ISIL strengthen or widen its territorial presence, potential consequences for Turkey or even Saudi Arabia or Kuwait can’t be ruled out. These cells would be first-level threat if ISIL and Al-Qaeda decided to join their efforts against the West because they would benefits from fundamental outpost in the region.

2.     Iran – From the past, through the present, to the future; and the nuclear issue

In the last decade, Teheran nuclear programme has been a sort of leitmotiv in Iran-West relations. Although the issue remains unsolved, things have changed in the last decade.

2.1. Nuclear plan origins

Iranian nuclear programme started in the ‘50s when Shah Mohammad Reza tried to modernize his Country. Before 1979 Revolution, this programme moved its first steps: for example, in 1958 Iran became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in 1967 they acquired a research reactor from the United States and they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 letting IAEA scan their programme. Before 1979, Iran had been able to start building the first nuclear implant near Bushehr thanks to US and European investments but the Revolution shut all these open doors and inevitably put an end to the international cooperation regime so much so that the project lay dormant until the 80s when the programme was resumed rising Western concerns due to its potential military use.

2.2. 2002 revelations and Mahmud Ahmadinejad presidency (2005-2013)

Iranian nuclear project development didn’t receive any particular attention during the ‘90s but the issue came back to the fore in 2002 when members of the dissident National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two nuclear sites that were secretively being built in Arak and Natanz (the last one with uranium enrichment purposes). October 2003 agreements between Iran on one side, and France, Germany and Great Britain on the other, seemed able to solve the crisis but everything changed when Ahmadinejad was elected. Ahmadinejad reactivated the uranium enrichment programme so much so that on 11 April 2006 he declared on TV that Iran had successfully completed its first enrichment process. International political climate became particularly tense due to the nuclear programme and a verbally aggressive international politic against Israel and United States. In fact, many were sure that Iran was enriching uranium with military purposes.

Because Iran did not give application to 1696 UN resolution (31 July 2006) commanding to stop uranium enrichment process, a sort of “sanctions era” began (see table below). In such a climate, all efforts made by P5+1 Group[4] were unsuccessful.

Table 2: Relevant UN resolutions against Iran [source: Resolution n. 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929].

2.3. Could 2013 be considered as a turning point in Iran-West relations?

On August 4 2013 Iran changed its President: Hassan Rouhani was elected as Ahmadinejad successor. This could be considered as a fundamental event in terms of consequences on Iran-West relations. Due to the fact that Iran is facing serious problem caused by the long lasting international sanctions, Rouhani agreed to discuss Iranian nuclear project with international counterparts in order to obtain a vital loosening on these sanctions. One of the key-events in this direction was memorable phone call between Obama and Rouhani himself that occurred on September 27, 2013: such occurrence injected optimism and both sides joined 15-16 October negotiations in a positively charged climate.

Inevitable hitches aside, the P5+1 Group signed a fundamental ad interim agreement (Joint Plan of Action) on November 24. Basically, it states that Iran would benefit from a sanctions reduction if:

- stops enriching uranium over 5% and reduce all over 5% stocks,

- opens Natanz and Fordow sites to IAEA inspectors,

-  stops building Arak reactor.

Picture 2: Iranian nuclear facilities [source: Hussain Hassan, Iranian Nuclear Sites, CRS Report for Congress, August 2007].

Table 3: Iranian Nuclear Facilities [sources: Hussain Hassan, Iranian Nuclear Sites, CRS Report for Congress, August 2007; International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 February 2014; www.nti.org].

Despites some concerns (mainly expressed by Israel), the agreement went into effecton January 20, 2014.

Although a positive feeling hasn’t faded away, there is no final agreement to talk about. Having already postponed the deadline by which this agreement should be signed (from July 20 to November 24), the question is: will they be able to sign it by then? Oddly enough, it’s clear that such agreement would be convenient for everybody: Iran needs to have international sanctions loosen in order to come out from the last decade isolation; global economy may benefit from international investments that may come from potentially interested foreign enterprises; finally, with this issue over, international efforts could be focused on ISIL offensive in Iraq (given the fact that it poses a serious threat for both Iraq and the West).

3.     Ukraine – A military crisis tied to a never-ending dispute over Russian gas

The Ukrainian crisis can be considered as a complex twist made of political, economic and military relations between Ukraine and Russia (and pro-Russia separatist forces), while European Union and United States support Kiev as interested parties. The crisis started in late 2013 and it is possible to identify three different phases:

- 1^st phase: Euromaidan protests (November 2013 – February 2014),

- 2^nd phase: Crimean crisis (February 2014 – March 2014),

- 3^rd phase: Eastern Ukraine crisis (April 2014 – ongoing).

Simultaneously, political relations between Moscow and Kiev are particularly tense due to the Russian gas supply issue.

3.1. From Maidan to the Crimean crisis

The whole Ukrainian crisis started on November 21 when a wave of pro-Europe, anti-government and “anti-Russia” demonstrations took place in Maidan Square (in Kiev). What caused these demonstrations was the government decision to rebuild a close economic partnership with Russia dropping out of the European integration process that Kiev had been following since 1994, when Ukraine started a political dialogue with the EU signing a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).  In a short while protests starched out from Maidan to the rest of the Country. The days between 18and 20 February were the proverbial “point of no return”, when ten people died in clashes with the police in Kiev. The backdraught caused by this event forced President Viktor Yanukovich to flee on February 21. However, Euromaidan victory caused the beginning of the crisis in Crimea.

In fact, most of Ukrainians with Russian origins refused to recognize the new government that took office after Yanukovich and started a pro-Russia wave of demonstrations. Their epicentre was in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where 60% of its population has Russian origins[5]. In a few days the real crisis burst out due to Russian gunmen intervention. At the same time, people created “self-defence forces” targeting governmental offices while paramilitary groups started taking control of strategic infrastructure (such as military basis, ports and airports). Clashes went on until March 15 when an independence referendum announced by the Crimean Supreme Council ratified (with 96,77% of votes), de facto, Crimea “transfert” from Ukraine to Russia.

3.2. Eastern Ukraine crisis

The crisis reached other areas in southern and eastern Ukraine in early March when different protests burst out in Donetsk, Lugansk and Odessa Oblasts. Protests turned into armed conflict. 

Picture 3: Situation in eastern Ukraine [source: National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine]

Separatist forces, supported by Russian paramilitary groups, started their anti-government campaign primarily in Donbass region (an area that consists of both Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts). Kiev labelled their initiatives as acts of terrorism and responded launching different military operations in order to reconquer all territories occupied by separatist militias. Kiev offensive forced pro-Russian to withdraw from their northern and southern previous position. Consequently, combats are currently taking place in the “middle” of Donbass region: across Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts, closed to the Russian border (see Picture 3 – previous page).

Meanwhile, two important piece of news came from international politics world: Russian parliament cancelled the resolution that would have allowed a potential military intervention in Ukraine (June 25); Ukraine, along with Georgia and Moldavia, signed an Association Agreement with the European Union (June 27). This two events bear relevant consequences: the first one, although it doesn’t cancel all sanctions that EU and US have been emitting since the beginning of the crisis, it may help in loosening international tensions over Ukrainian situation[6]; the second one, throw Kiev into EU “arms” resuming the whole process that they started in 1994.

Picture 4: Targets of US-EU sanctions which are liked to Vladimir Putin [source: BBC].

3.3. The Ukrainian crisis and the Russian gas issue

What can be called the “Russian gas issue” (related to gas supplies that both Ukraine and Europe need and buy from Moscow) complicates the resolution of the multidimensional Ukrainian crisis.

Between 2005 and 2006, a dispute over Gazprom gas distribution raised tension between Kiev and Moscow, indirectly involving the European Union since EU Members receive their supplies through Ukraine. This gas crisis, caused by unpaid Ukrainian debts contracted purchasing Russian gas, was solved thanks to a sudden agreement that Gazprom and Naftogaz (Ukrainian gas company) signed on January 4. A new UE-Ukraine-Russia gas crisis burst out in early 2009 when Gazprom decided to stop gas flux once again. A new agreement between the parties solved the crisis on January 18.

The current Ukrainian political and military crisis has brought the gas issue back on the table. In this context, Russia is able to use gas as a political weapon: in June Gazprom decided to stop gas supply unless Naftogaz pays part of its debt (1,5 billion out of 4,5[7])[8]. In the meantime, the realization of the new South Streams pipeline goes on: when it is operational, this pipeline will cut off Ukraine and reach European countries directly from the Black Sea (see picture below). South Stream project is quite relevant to the European Union: on the one hand, since EU has been focusing on the so called “Security of Energy Supply” issue, it would guarantee gas supplies avoiding non-Members countries and potential frictions that they might have with Russia; but on the other one, it puts Brussels on the spot since the EU can’t neither avoid condemning Russia for its involvement in Ukrainian crisis, nor “live” without Russian gas. 

Picture 5: South Stream project and other gas pipelines from Russia [source: burnanenergyjournal.com].

3.4. Ukrainian foreseeable future

Although it is difficult to provide accurate forecasts about Ukrainian future, it is possible to think of three potential developments. In order of likelihood:

1)      separatist forces will scatter and flee across the border,

2)      separatist forces will surrender to the Ukrainian army and to Ukrainian government,

3)      should separatist forces barricade in Donetsk or in other relevant cities, the government may be forced to satisfy their demands (or at least part of them) in order to avoid bloodsheds and intolerable casualties among non-combatant population.

It may be relatively easier to provide forecasts about the gas issue. Although the situation hasn’t changed much since June, things are likely to evolve within the next few months. According to what Naftogaz declared in June, Ukraine will be able hold up and provide supply for both Ukrainians and European countries until December[9]. Anyway, international “diplomacy” is expected to reach a new agreement since missing it would probably worsen political relation between Russia and western counterparts.

4.     Conclusions

The purpose of this article was to paint a picture of Iraqi, Iranian and Ukrainian crisis. Considering what was said in all previous pages, international community should be seriously concerned and focused on their solution. Of the three of them, however, the Iraqi crisis could be the most insidious one, at least in terms of potential and yet unpredictable consequences on global security. The Iranian nuclear issue is the one that is most likely to be solved in the short term: all long lasting efforts could produce their result by this fall. Finally, the Ukrainian crisis: its complexity is caused by many interests at stake and since it is not only a matter of internal security but it involves both political and economic related matters, it may take a while to find a stable solution that satisfies all involved parties.